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UNCERTAINTY LEADS TO JAIL TIME: THE STATUS
OF THE COMMON-LAW REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

[Tihe forced disclosure of reporters' confidences will abort the gathering and analysis of news, and thus, of course, restrain its dissemination. The reporter's access is the public's access.1
INTRODUCTION

Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald's investigation into who
leaked the name of CIA operative Valerie Plame to the press appears
to be coming to a close. Fitzgerald spent roughly two-and-a-half years
questioning reporters and digging into the conversations they had with
their sources of information. The investigation has focused on many
White House officials, 2 all of whom seem to be at least tangentially
involved, but it appears that the original source of the information was
Richard Armitage, the former Assistant Secretary of State to Colin
3
Powell.
Fitzgerald's investigation resulted in the jailing of reporter Judith
Miller and the indictment of now-former Vice Presidential Chief of
Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby. 4 Miller has agreed to disclose her
source in exchange for her release, 5 and the press's and public's attention to the story has died down, but the damage to the profession of
journalism has already been done. Compelling reporters to disclose
1. Jennifer Elrod, Protecting Journalistsfrom Compelled Disclosure: A Proposalfor a Federal
Statute, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 115, 175 (2003) (alterations in original) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 84-85 (1975)).

2. As of May 2006, the focus appeared to be on Vice President Dick Cheney. See R. Jeffrey
Smith & Jim VandeHei, Filings in CIA Leak Case Paint Cheney as Determined to Counter Critic,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at A6. At other points during the investigation, political advisor
Karl Rove also appeared to be the focus. See Rick Klein, Democrats' Reid Urges Bush to Oust
Rove, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2005, at Al. Valerie Plame believes Vice President Cheney, I.
Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Karl Rove, and Richard Armitage were all involved, and has named
them all in a civil lawsuit regarding the leak. Outed CIA Agent Plame Adds Armitage to Lawsuit,
CNN.com, Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/20061POLITICS/09/13/cia.leak/index.html.
3. R. Jeffrey Smith, Armitage Says He Was Source of CIA Leak, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at
A3.
4. See Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005,
at Al (reporting the jailing of Judith Miller); see also Michael Kranish, Cheney Aide Indicted;
Libby Resigns over Perjury Charges in CIA Leak Case; Rove Probe Goes on, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 29, 2005, at Al (reporting the indictment of Scooter Libby).
5. See Susan Schmidt & Jim VandeHei, Reporter in CIA Leak Case Released from Jail, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 30, 2005, at 12.
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their sources has seriously injured the essential relationship between
reporters and the confidential sources they use for so many of their
stories.
While the press plays a fundamental role in society, it is equally
important that the government be able to enforce the law. When
these two essential interests collide, it becomes very difficult to determine which should yield. But when the government seeks to compel
reporters to reveal the confidential sources on which they rely, the
press must prevail.
The issue of compelled disclosure of reporters' sources has been a
subject of controversy for many years. Some argue that the press
must be protected, while others argue that this protection prevents
other institutions, such as a grand jury, from functioning. 6 Reporters
generally argue that both the First Amendment and the common law
provide them with protection. 7 This Comment focuses only on the
common law and argues that a recent D.C. Circuit decision, 8 which
refused to protect Matthew Cooper and Judith Miller, incorrectly analyzed the common-law issue. The D.C. Circuit should have taken the
approach of the Southern District of New York, fully analyzed the
issue, and found that there is a common-law privilege for reporters
and their sources. This Comment concludes by evaluating the dangerous effect that the D.C. Circuit's approach will have on both reporters
and the press in general. The best way to stave off the inevitable damage is for the Supreme Court to recognize a reporter's privilege under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 9
Part II reviews the background of the reporter's privilege, discussing Rule 501 and the Supreme Court cases that have applied the
rule. 10 It also discusses In re Grand Jury Subpoena" and New York
Times Co. v. Gonzales.12 Part III evaluates both of those cases and
asks which court took the better approach. 13 Part IV discusses the
effect these decisions will have on reporters and their sources, and
suggests that the Supreme Court should resolve the question of the
6. See, e.g., Leslye deRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a Federal Journalist's
Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779 (1991).

7. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
8. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Cooper v. United States and Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
9. FED. R. EvID. 501.

10.
11.
12.
13.

See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

20-85 and accompanying text.
86-120 and accompanying text.
121-150 and accompanying text.
151-259 and accompanying text.

2007]

THE COMMON-LAW REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

725

common-law reporter's privilege by recognizing its existence under
Rule 501.14
II.

BACKGROUND

This Part explains the history of the law of privilege, how the reporter's privilege has evolved, and where the law currently stands. It
begins with a discussion of the development of common-law privileges
and their codification into Federal Rule of Evidence 501.15 Next, it
discusses the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 501 through an
explanation of Jaffee v. Redmond.16 This Part then briefly discusses
the Supreme Court's protection of the press' 7 and the history of the
reporter's privilege. 18 Finally, it introduces two current cases, In re
Grand Jury Subpoena and New York Times Co. v. Gonzales. 19
A.

The History of Privilege and Rule 501

Privilege is a familiar concept. The idea that privileges should protect relationships has its basis in Roman law, which provided that "the
basis for exclusion [of testimony] was the general moral duty not to
violate the underlying fidelity upon which the protected relationship
was built."2 0° Most people, both inside and outside of the legal field,
know that there are some situations in which a person cannot be compelled to testify. 21 The oldest recognized courtroom privilege is the
attorney-client privilege, which has been acknowledged since the time
of Queen Elizabeth 1.22 Although the attorney-client privilege was
first accepted as part of "an attorney's code of honor as a gentleman," 23 it is now well understood that rules of privilege exist to
14. See infra notes 260-282 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 49-85 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 86-150 and accompanying text.
20. Raymond F. Miller, Comment, CreatingEvidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 782 (1999) (alterations in original) (quoting State ex rel.
State Highway Dep't v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d 799, 806 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963)).
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself").
22. Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The FederalSettlement Privilege and the Proper Use of FederalRule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New Privileges, 35
U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 261 (2005) (noting that the common law also recognized a privilege between spouses, a privilege for government information, and a voting privilege).
23. Id.
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"promote trust, confidence, and full disclosure between two parties. ' 24
This understanding is an essential element of privilege jurisprudence
today.
Until 1974, the federal law of privilege remained stagnant, recognizing only the attorney-client privilege, the spousal privilege, the government-information privilege, and the voting privilege. 25 In 1961,
however, Congress authorized Chief Justice Earl Warren to create a
committee to determine whether a federal code of evidence should be
drafted. 26 The committee returned a set of proposed rules that would
have codified nine separate privileges: the attorney-client privilege,
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the husband-wife testimonial
privilege, the clergyman privilege, the voting privilege, the trade
secrets privilege, the state secret privilege, the informant privilege,
and reports privileged by statute. 27 Congress, however, rejected the
proposed rule as too rigid, and instead enacted the more flexible ver28
sion that stands today.
That decision was prompted by two considerations. First, there was
some concern that the proposed law would "freeze the law of privilege
as it existed. ' 29 Second, there were some privileges that the nine proposed rules did not recognize, including a physician-patient privilege,
a general spousal privilege, and a reporter's privilege. 30 If the original
version were enacted, it might have foreclosed the possible development of those, or any other, privileges. 31 In the end, Congress placed
the burden of creating and recognizing privileges on federal courts by
adopting Rule 501, which endorsed a case-by-case approach governed
'32
by "reason and experience.
24. Kenneth R. Tucker, Note, Did Congress Err in Failing to Set Forth Codified Rules Governing PrivilegedRelationshipsand Resulting Communications?, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 181,
204-05 (1994).
25. Lauderdale, supra note 22, at 261-71 (discussing cases recognizing the various types of
privileges); see also id. at 271-73 (stating that few courts had recognized other privileges, but that
they were recognized in state statutory law rather than federal common law).
26. Id. at 273.
27. Miller, supra note 20, at 773 n.10.
28. See Lauderdale, supra note 22, at 275-76.
29. Id. at 275 (alterations omitted) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Hungate)).
30. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1465
(1985). There was also concern over inconsistencies in the proposed rules, such as protecting
communication between a psychotherapist and his patient, but not a physician and his patient.
Id. at 1468.
31. See Lauderdale, supra note 22, at 274 ("[T]he Advisory Committee proposed codification
of the 'every man's evidence' rule, under which privilege would not exist under federal law
except as it was provided in Proposed Rules 502 through 510 .... ").
32. FED. R. EviD. 501 ("Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress . . . the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the

2007]

THE COMMON-LAW REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
B.

727

Rule 501 Applied

Since the rule was approved, federal courts have been reluctant to
create new privileges. 3 3 The Supreme Court faced a few privilege
cases after Rule 501 was passed, 34 but it was not until twenty-two
years later, in Jaffee v. Redmond,35 that the Court used Rule 501 to
recognize a new privilege. In Jaffee, the Court was asked to determine
whether the family of a man who was killed by a police officer was
entitled to notes taken by the officer's therapist in counseling sessions
after the shooting. 36 The officer claimed that the contents of her conversations with her psychotherapist were privileged. 37 The Court analyzed the question under Rule 501, but recognized that the ability to
create new privileges should not be taken lightly; "the public has a
right to every man's evidence," 38 and privileges are antithetical to that
general maxim. Therefore, a privilege would only be recognized if it
furthered a public interest that was more important than the evidence
itself.39 To determine whether a privilege between psychotherapists
and their patients met this requirement, the Court analyzed the public
and private interests at stake, balanced those interests against the evidentiary benefit, and asked whether the states had recognized the
privilege. 40 The Court concluded that important public and private
interests that would be furthered by the privilege outweighed any evidentiary benefit that might result if the privilege were not recognized. 41 This conclusion was bolstered by the fact that every state, as
well as the District of Columbia, had recognized the privilege. 42 In
light of these considerations, the Court adopted the privilege.
C. Supreme Court Protection of the Press
The Supreme Court has long protected the press, most notably in
New York Times Co. v. United States.43 In that case, the Government
sought to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.").
33. Lauderdale, supra note 22, at 276.
34. See id. at 276-79.
35. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 9 (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 10-13.
41. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-12.
42. Id. at 12-13.
43. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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printing information leaked to them by a source inside the Pentagon. 44
The Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion stating that there was
a presumption of unconstitutionality for prior restraints on speech.
Consequently, the Government had to carry a heavy burden to overcome that presumption, which it failed to do. 45 The decision included
six concurrences and three dissents, each of which discussed the importance of the press. Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Potter Stewart believed that one of the most important functions of the
press was to keep the public informed. Justice Black stated that "[t]he
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government
and inform the people. '' 46 This belief was echoed by Justice Stewart,
who proclaimed that "without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people. ' 47 Although the Court has yet to recognize a privilege for reporters, it has continued to protect the press in
other ways because the interests recognized in New York Times Co. v.
48
United States are still present today.
D.

The History of the Reporter's Privilege

The Supreme Court's protection of the press has not extended into
the area of the reporter's privilege. The concept of a reporter's privilege is based on a perceived ethical duty of reporters to uphold
44. Id. at 714. For a background discussion of the case, see William R. Glendon, The Pentagon Papers- Victory for a Free Press,19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295 (1998). The documents that the
papers sought to print have become known as the "Pentagon Papers." Id. at 1295. The documents were the result of a secret task force created by then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to study the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Id. Daniel Ellsberg, a former military
man, government employee, and government consultant, obtained one of only fifteen copies of
the top secret documents, copied them, and leaked them to the New York Times and Washington
Post for publication. Id. at 1296.
45. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
46. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). This position has been echoed in later Supreme Court
cases, such as Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), in which Justice Byron
White stated that "[w]ithout the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally." Id. at 492.
47. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (permitting media broadcast of a lawfully received tape of a cellular phone conversation that was retrieved in violation of federal and
Pennsylvania wiretap acts, because the First Amendment interest in publishing matters of public
interest outweighed the individual's privacy rights); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980) (protecting the press's right of access to criminal trials); Landmark Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating a state statute that prohibited divulging information relating to confidential matters pending before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission, as applied to a newspaper that reported the Commission was planning an investigation of a state court judge); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating an order
from a state court prohibiting newspapers and broadcasters from publishing or broadcasting
accounts of confessions made by a murder suspect).
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promises not to reveal the names of their sources. As early as 1934,
the American Newspaper Guild stated that "[n]ewspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or investigating bodies. '49 This has
been described "as a duty 'not only to the source, but to journalism as
well.' "50
The question of whether reporters should be afforded a privilege
against the compelled disclosure of their sources is not new. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue, but not within the context of
Rule 501.51 The last time the Court confronted the issue was in
Branzburg v. Hayes,52 two years before Rule 501 was enacted.
Branzburg combined four cases involving reporters asked to reveal
their sources. 5 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer a single question: "Whether a newspaper reporter who has published articles about an organization can, under the First Amendment, properly
refuse to appear before a grand jury investigating possible crimes by
members of that organization who have been quoted in the published
articles. '54 The Court recognized that the First Amendment protects
newsgathering, but to avoid answering the question of privilege, it
characterized the issue as whether news reporters have the same obligation as other citizens to answer questions before a grand jury. 55 In
essence, the Court balanced the protection provided by the First
Amendment against the importance of the grand jury's function, and
found the importance of the grand jury to be controlling. 56 In the
Court's view, the purpose of the grand jury-to determine "if there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and [to
protect] citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions" 5 7-could
49. Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONz. L. REV. 445, 452 (2002-2003) (quoting Michel
Petheram, Confidentiality of Sources, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS IN POLITICS
AND THE MEDIA 71, 72 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 2001)).
50. Id. (quoting JEFFREY OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 41 (1988)).

51. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
52. Id.
53. The case combined Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Branzburg v.
Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App.
1971); and In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971). In the Branzburg cases, a reporter was
asked to reveal sources for two stories on drug use and production in Kentucky. 408 U.S. at 668.
In re Pappas and Caldwell both involved reporters who were asked to reveal the identities of
members of the Black Panther Party. Id. at 673, 675.
54. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679 n.16 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 681-82.
56. Id. at 682-92.
57. Id. at 686-87.
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not be outweighed by the protection of the First Amendment. 58 The
Court refused to find that the First Amendment reached "so far as to
override the interest of the public in ensuring that neither reporter nor
source is invading the rights of other citizens through reprehensible

'59
conduct forbidden to all other persons.
Branzburg has proven difficult for courts to interpret and apply
with uniformity. 60 Some have read the decision to say that there is no

privilege for reporters under any theory, rather than just under the
First Amendment. 61 Others, however, have relied on Justice Lewis
Powell's concurrence-the fifth and deciding vote-to support the
62
conclusion that a reporter can invoke a privilege in some situations.
Justice Powell's concurrence stated that there would be some protection for reporters under the Court's decision. 63 He qualified the
Court's decision by stating "that no harassment of newsmen [would]
be tolerated." 64 If the reporter believed that "the grand jury investigation [was] not being conducted in good faith," or he was "called
upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation," he could file a motion to
quash and the court could enter a protective order. 65 The concurrence
advocated a case-by-case approach, which would allow courts to strike
''a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of
all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct."'66 This case-by-case balancing approach has given courts the
flexibility needed to find a reporter's privilege in some situations.

58. The Court noted that "the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press." Id. at 682. In addition, the press was not free to print everything that it wanted
to and did not have a special right to information that was not generally accessible to the general
public. Id. at 683-84.
59. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691-92.
60. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d
160 (2d Cir. 2006).
61. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Cooper v. United States and Miller v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005).
62. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that Branzburgrecognized a
qualified privilege for reporters); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.
1986) (stating that Branzburg established that, to determine whether there is a privilege, the
court has to "balance the interests involved"); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721,
725 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that Branzburg held that reporters have to disclose information in
grand jury proceedings unless there is an abuse of power).
63. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 710.
66. Id.
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One such court is the Third Circuit, which has found that there is a
68
privilege for reporters under Rule 501.67 In Riley v. City of Chester,
a reporter refused to testify as to the name of the source she used to
write an article about an investigation of a mayoral candidate. 69 The
court based its decision on Rule 501, rather than the First Amendment. 70 Unlike the Supreme Court in Branzburg, the Third Circuit
was convinced that there was a danger in damaging the relationship
between a reporter and his confidential source if the privilege were
not recognized. 7 ' Instead of finding that Branzburg precluded recognition of the privilege, the Third Circuit used the public policy articulated in Branzburg to support its conclusion that reporters do have a
72
qualified privilege under Rule 501 to refuse to divulge their sources.
After acknowledging the important public interests at play, the court
asked whether those interests were more important than the evidence
that could be gathered if the privilege were not recognized. 73 This
approach draws directly from Justice Powell's concurrence in
Branzburg.74 The Riley court emphasized that the case was a civil
matter and "not a situation where the reporter [was] alleged to possess evidence relevant to a criminal investigation, ' 75 and that "the in67. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 718 (3d Cir. 1979). The Third Circuit has been
joined by the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding some
kind of privilege held by reporters. See, e.g., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d
1176 (1st Cir. 1988) (extending the privilege to criminal cases); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980) (recognizing a qualified privilege); Gonzales v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a qualified privilege for nonconfidential information in civil cases under the First Amendment); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding a qualified privilege for confidential information under the First Amendment);
LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a qualified privilege
based on a balancing test); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980)
(finding a qualified First Amendment privilege in a libel case); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d
986 (8th Cir. 1972) (recognizing a privilege as long as there is no actual malice); Shoen v. Shoen,
5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the privilege protects investigative authors); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding a qualified privilege depending on
whether alternative sources have been exhausted, whether the information goes to the heart of
the matter, whether it is relevant, and the nature of the controversy); United States v. Caporale,
806 F.2d 1487 (lth Cir. 1986) (finding a privilege unless the information is highly relevant,
necessary to the case, and not available from other sources). But see McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339
F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding no reporter's privilege when the source was known and had no
objection to the disclosure, and the reporter had no valid interest in maintaining confidentiality).
68. 612 F.2d 708.
69. Id. at 711.
70. See id. at 713.
71. Id. at 714.
72. Id. at 715 (noting that the BranzburgCourt realized that it was important to further "unfettered communication to the public of information, comment and opinion").
73. Id. at 716.
74. Riley, 612 F.2d at 715-16.
75. Id. at 716.
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formation sought to be disclosed appear[ed] to have only marginal
relevance to the plaintiff's case."'76 Consequently, the court recog77
nized a qualified privilege for reporters in civil cases.
One year later, the Third Circuit extended this holding to criminal
cases in United States v. Cuthbertson.78 In Cuthbertson, a restaurant
chain, indicted on conspiracy and fraud charges, sought to discover
notes taken by CBS reporters while they were investigating the restaurant for a report on fast-food franchising. 79 CBS moved to quash
the subpoena by asserting a privilege not to divulge unpublished information. 80 The defendants argued that the privilege recognized in
Riley was inapplicable to criminal cases.8 1 The court disagreed, finding that "the interests of the press that form the foundation for the
privilege are not diminished because the nature of the underlying proceeding out of which the request for the information arises is a crimi8' 2
nal trial.
The courts are not the only place where a privilege protecting reporters can be created. Some state legislatures have enacted so-called
shield laws, which protect reporters from forced testimony. As of
March 2005, thirty states and the District of Columbia had adopted
some kind of protection for reporters.8 3 Some shield laws provide absolute protection; others apply only in specific situations.8 4 When
Branzburg was decided, only seventeen states had enacted shield
85
laws.
E. The Current Cases
In the past year, two federal courts decided high-profile cases addressing the common-law reporter's privilege. The courts take entirely different analytical approaches, come to contrary conclusions,
and thus highlight the need for the Supreme Court to clarify whether
reporters are protected from the compelled disclosure of their
sources.
76. Id. at 718.
77. Id.
78. 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 142.
80. Id. at 144.
81. Id. at 146.
82. Id. at 147.
83. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d
160 (2d Cir. 2006).
84. Id.

85. deRoos Rood & Grossman, supra note 6, at 794.

2007]
1.

THE COMMON-LAW REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

733

In re Grand Jury Subpoena

On February 15, 2005, the D.C. Circuit decided In re Grand Jury
Subpoena against the background of a growing government controversy.8 6 The appeal combined the cases of reporters Matthew Cooper
of Time Magazine and Judith Miller of the New York Times.8 7 The
controversy grew out of President George W. Bush's State of the
Union Address on January 28, 2003, in which he claimed that "[t]he
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa. 8 8s Roughly six months
later, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson penned an op-ed piece in the
New York Times claiming that he was sent to investigate the President's assertion but found no credible evidence to support it.89 On
July 14, 2003, reporter Robert Novak published a column on the controversy, in which he stated that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was a
CIA agent, and that "[t]wo senior administration officials told [Novak
that Wilson's] wife suggested sending Wilson to Niger to investigate"
the claim. 90 After that, other authors wrote articles stating that they
also had been given the same information from official sources. 9 1
Cooper and Miller were subpoenaed because both of them allegedly
received the same information from administration officials. 92
In the midst of this controversy, the Department of Justice began to
investigate whether any Bush administration official had in fact leaked
the name of a CIA operative-an action which would have violated
federal law. 9 3 As a part of the investigation, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald subpoenaed Time, Cooper, and Miller for any information relating to Cooper's and Miller's articles which claimed that an
administration official had also told them about Plame's identity. 94
86. 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cooper v. United States and Miller v.
United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
87. Id. at 967.
88. Id. at 965.
89. Id. at 966.
90. Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 31.
91. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 966.

92. Id. at 966-67.
93. See id. at 966. It is illegal for anyone with "authorized access to classified information that
identifies a covert agent" to "intentionally disclose[ ] any information identifying such covert
agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States." 50
U.S.C. § 421(a) (2000).
94. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 966-67. Many believe that the investigation is
partly motivated by the concern that the government may have intentionally leaked Valerie
Plame's name to retaliate against Wilson's critique of the Administration. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Toobin, Name That Source, NEw YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30 (quoting Martin Kaplan, the
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All parties moved to quash the subpoenas, but those motions were
denied. 9 5 The parties refused to comply, and the district court held
them in contempt. 96 All parties then appealed that decision, arguing
that there was a First Amendment privilege against compulsion, that
there was a common-law privilege against compulsion, that their due
process rights were violated, and that the Special Counsel had failed
to comply with Department of Justice guidelines regarding the sub97
poena of reporters.
The D.C. Circuit published a majority opinion and three separate
concurrences, one by each of the judges who heard the case. 98 The
majority opinion addressed the common-law question in a single paragraph, which contained almost no analysis. 99 It stated simply that
"[t]he Court [was] not of one mind on the existence of a common law
privilege," 10 0 but that "if there [was] any such privilege, it [was] not
absolute and may be overcome by an appropriate showing." 10 1 The
court found that the Government had succeeded in overcoming any
privilege.1 02 Therefore, the circuit court affirmed the district court's
decision. 10 3 Each judge then wrote a concurring opinion detailing his
or her own approach to the common-law privilege.
Judge David Sentelle wrote that reporters enjoyed no special privilege when called to testify in front of a grand jury "beyond the protection against harassing grand juries conducting groundless
investigations that [was] available to all other citizens. ' 10 4 He based
his approach on Branzburg, which he believed had decided that there
was no common-law privilege, even though that case was premised on
a constitutional question. 0 5 Assuming that Branzburg did foreclose
the possibility of a common-law privilege, he believed that the D.C.
Associate Dean of the Annenberg School for Communication, as saying, "What they did in the
Plame case was to use the press's requirements for observing ground rules with sources as a way
of making reporters enablers of a smear campaign").
95. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 966-67.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 967-68. Although this Comment focuses only on the common-law privilege, it is
necessary in the interest of completeness to mention that the court found that there was no First
Amendment Privilege based on Branzburg, that the due process argument was without merit,
and that the Department of Justice guidelines were inapplicable in this situation.
98. See infra notes 104-120.
99. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 972-73.
100. Id. at 973.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 972-73, 976.
104. Id. at 976 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
105. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 977 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
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Circuit was bound by that decision. 0 6 He also believed that Rule 501
did not supersede the Court's decision in Branzburg.'0 7 Moreover,
the question of a common-law privilege for reporters necessarily required the resolution of a number of policy questions, which he believed were better placed in the hands of the legislature. 10 8 Judge
Sentelle concluded that there was no common-law privilege protecting
reporters from grand jury subpoenas. 10 9
Judge Karen Henderson's concurrence did not resolve the question
of whether there was a common-law privilege protecting reporters.
Instead, she argued that the court should never have reached the
question of whether a privilege exists because all three judges agreed
that the Government had overcome the privilege. 110 She concluded
by commenting on the approaches taken by her fellow judges."'
Finally, Judge David Tatel argued that there is a common-law privilege for reporters, which has its foundation in Rule 501.112 Judge
Tatel focused his discussion primarily on Rule 501, which he believed
obligated the court to evaluate the arguments for and against the requested privilege and make a determination "in the light of reason
and experience." '1 3 To do this, the court had to follow the Supreme
Court's ruling in Jaffee, which detailed the factors to be examined
when determining whether a common-law privilege exists under Rule
501.114 Moreover, it was necessary for the court to resolve this issue
because it would come up again, and it was therefore vital to provide
guidance to lower courts faced with the issue. 1 5 Relying on the Jaffee
case, Judge Tatel determined that refusing to recognize the privilege
would have the detrimental effect of chilling discussions between reporters and their confidential sources, a relationship which had been
extremely important to reporters in the past. 11 6 This would diminish
106. Id. at 978.
107. Id. (stating that, because the language of Rule 501 comes from cases decided before
Branzburg, the rule does not give courts anymore power than they had at the time of
Branzburg).
108. Id. at 979-81 (noting that if the court were to create a privilege, it would also have to
create the scope of the privilege).
109. Id. at 981.
110. Id. at 981-82 (Henderson, J.,concurring).
111. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 983 (Henderson, J., concurring) (stating that,
contrary to Judge Sentelle's conclusion, Branzburg did not decide the issue of the common-law
privilege); see also id. at 984 (stating that Jaffee and Rule 501 do not give the court the power to
create a privilege "for any group ... that demands one").
112. Id. at 986-89 (Tatel, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 989 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 990.
116. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 995 (Tatel, J.,concurring).
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the quality of news available to the public. 117 Moreover, as the Court

recognized in Jaffee, without a privilege it would be unlikely that the
evidence the prosecution was seeking would ever come into being in
1 18
the first place. The evidentiary benefit would therefore be low.
The fact that forty-nine states had extended some level of protection

for reporters "confirm[ed] that 'reason and experience' support[ed]
recognition of the privilege." 119 In light of these factors, Judge Tatel

concluded that there was a common-law privilege protecting
reporters.

120

2. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales
Less than one month later, the Southern District of New York confronted the same issue in New York Times Co. v. Gonzales.1 2' In
Gonzales, the New York Times sought to prevent the Government
from compelling the production of two of its reporters' phone
records.1 22 The two reporters, Judith Miller and Philip Shenon, wrote
articles on two Islamic charities, the Global Relief Foundation, Inc.
and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. 123 The

Government claimed that both reporters tipped off the organizations
to government activity when, consistent with the newspaper's policy,

the reporters called the organizations to obtain comments for an upcoming article. 124 The reporters each used information obtained from
confidential sources to write their articles. 25 As in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, the Government began an investigation to determine the
source of the leaks. 12 6 As part of the investigation, the Government
sought to obtain the reporters' records, hoping that their notes would
117. Id. at 991.
118. Id. In Jaffee, the Court reasoned that if patients thought their psychiatrists could be
compelled to testify to what they said, then patients would not confide in their psychiatrists in
the first place. 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996). Similarly, if confidential sources believe that the reporters they talk to could be compelled to give up their names, they will be less likely to come
forward, and there would be no evidence for the prosecution to uncover.
119. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 993 (Tatel, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13).
120. Id. at 995. Judge Tatel went on to conclude that the privilege is limited, however, and
only exists when the information is more newsworthy than harmful. Id. at 1001. In this case, the
leak was extremely harmful and had marginal news value, and therefore the privilege had been
overcome. Id. at 1002-03.
121. 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
122. Id. at 464.
123. Id. at 465.
124. Id. at 466-67.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 467.
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reveal the sources.1 2 7 After a series of letters between the New York
Times and the Government, the New York Times sought a declaratory
judgment that the phone records were protected by the First Amendment, a common-law privilege, and the Department of Justice
28
guidelines.'
Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Southern District of New York confronted the issue of a common-law privilege head on. 129 The court
decided to fully evaluate the issue, in part because Rule 501 was
drafted in a way that allowed courts the flexibility to analyze a privilege question when one was presented. 130 That, combined with the
fact that the Supreme Court had not analyzed the reporter's privilege
question since Rule 501 was enacted, gave the court leeway to address
13 1
the issue.
The court analyzed the question both under Rule 501 and within
the framework presented by Jaffee.13 2 Jaffee required the court to first
133
ask whether private interests would be furthered by the privilege.
Second, the court had to ask whether public interests would be furthered by the privilege. 134 If recognition of the privilege would further both private and public interests, then the court had to determine
if those interests outweighed the evidentiary benefit that would occur
if no privilege were recognized. 35 Finally, the court had to look for a
consensus amongst the states because its existence would indicate that
36
the privilege was supported by "reason and experience.'
The court realized the importance of allowing reporters to maintain
the confidentiality of their sources without fear that they may be compelled to reveal those sources. 137 Without the protection, there would
be a chilling effect on speech that would diminish a reporter's ability
to do his or her job. 138 In fact, both Miller and Shenon "testified that
127. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
128. Id. at 464. The court found that the Department of Justice Guidelines "confer no substantive rights," and therefore provided the New York Times with no protection. Id. at 484.
129. Id. at 492-513. The court also addressed the First Amendment privilege, and found that
Branzburg did not prevent a finding that there is a First Amendment privilege, particularly in
light of the way the Second Circuit had interpreted the case. Id. at 484-92. Therefore, the court
found that there was "a qualified First Amendment reporter's privilege with respect to confidential sources." Id. at 492.
130. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
131. Id. at 493-94.
132. Id. at 494.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 494-95.
137. Id. at 497.
138. Id.
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without information they have obtained in the past on condition that
the identity of their sources would be kept in confidence, neither journalist would have been able to report on a wide range of issues of
national significance." 139 In addition, to the extent that confidential
sources allow reporters to provide the public with better information,
the privilege would serve an important public interest. 140 That interest was exemplified by the fact that news stories ranging from Watergate to Abu Ghraib made it to the public only because people close to
141
the scandals were willing to speak on the condition of anonymity.
The importance of those stories made it clear to the court that "[tIhe
public ends achieved through recognition of a reporter's privilege are
1 42 The
... vital to our democracy and of 'transcendent importance.'
court acknowledged that the Government would enjoy an evidentiary
benefit if the privilege were not recognized, but decided it did not
outweigh the public and private interests that the privilege would protect. 143 Like the Court in Jaffee, the Gonzales court noted that the
evidentiary benefit would decrease in time as more potential sources
realized that their identity may not be kept secret. 144 Once that realization set in, "fewer sources [would] provide information of a sensitive nature to reporters where doing so [would] place[ ] them at risk of
losing their job or otherwise incurring some penalty should they be
identified."'' 45 That refusal to talk would mean that the evidence the
Government was so intent on discovering would never come into existence. 146 Therefore, any evidentiary benefit to the Government in
Gonzales would not carry on to other cases. 147 Finally, the court reiterated that "the existence of a consensus among the States indicates
1148
that reason and experience support recognition of the privilege,"
noting that forty-eight states, as well as the District of Columbia, had
recognized some level of protection for reporters. 149 Therefore, the
139. Id.
140. Id. at 498.
141. Id.
142. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996)).
143. Id. at 500-01.
144. Id. at 501.
145. Id. at 500.
146. Id. at 501.
147. Id.
148. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996)).
149. Id. at 502. The Gonzales court stated that thirty-one states had adopted shield laws. Id.
Fourteen had recognized a privilege in either the state's highest court or an appellate court. Id.
at 503. Meanwhile, in three other states, the reporter's privilege had been recognized by lower
courts. Id.
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court found that there was a common-law privilege for reporters
under Rule 501.150
III.

ANALYSIS

Within one month, two courts faced the issue of whether a reporter's privilege exists, but came to opposite conclusions. 151 Because
the freedom of the press and the enforcement of criminal laws are
both extremely important, it is easy to understand why such different
outcomes could result. 152 The D.C. Circuit, however, arrived at the
wrong outcome by failing to fully analyze the issue of a common-law
reporter's privilege, and in doing so, simply increased the ambiguity of
an already nebulous area. 153 The Southern District of New York, on
the other hand, took the proper approach and reached the correct
154
conclusion; future courts should follow suit.

A.

The Conflicting Interests

The issue of a reporter's privilege is particularly vexing because it
involves two important and fundamental aspects of American society:
the enforcement of criminal laws and the freedom of the press. 155 The
grand jury is a fundamental part of the American criminal justice system and is regarded as one of the most important steps towards indicting a person charged with a crime. 156 The institution is so
fundamental that it is mentioned in the Fifth Amendment of the Con150. Id. at 508. The court went on to find that the Government had not overcome the privilege because it could not show that the documents were necessary or that the information could
not be found elsewhere. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 510-12.
151. See supra notes 86-150 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 155-172 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 173-187 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 188-259 and accompanying text.
155. See Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
156. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972) (discussing the role of the grand jury in
federal criminal prosecutions). The Supreme Court had previously elaborated on the role of the
grand jury:
Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in
our society of standing between the accuser and the accused ... to determine whether a
charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice
and personal ill will.
Id. at 687 n.23 (alterations in original) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)). The
Court went on to discuss its scope:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of
whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of
the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual
will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
Id. at 688 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)).
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stitution. 157 The freedom of the press, however, is equally important
to a functioning democratic society. The press can serve many purposes and can be defined many ways-more so now due to ever increasing advances in technology158-but the true purpose of the press
is to provide information. 159 This function was obviously important to
the drafters of the Constitution because, like the grand jury, the freedom of press was also referred to in the Bill of Rights. 160 When these
two interests conflict, the task becomes finding "the proper relationship between two vitally important aspects of our democracy: the free
press on the one hand and the fair and full administration of criminal
justice on the other."' 161 It is extremely difficult, to determine which
162
one should prevail.
Judge Tatel acknowledged the difficulty inherent in analyzing these
two institutions in his concurrence in In re Grand Jury Subpoena.
While freedom of the press "is basic to a free society," he wrote, "basic too are courts of justice. ' 163 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the
investigation centered on the leak of a CIA agent's name. 164 If there
was in fact a leak, federal law may have been violated.165 To determine whether there was a leak, the prosecutor called on the reporters
who had been given the agent's name to testify about their sources. 166
Acquiring that information became exceedingly more difficult when
both of the reporters refused to testify, claiming a privilege against
compelled revelation of their sources. 167 If their claim prevailed, then
the privilege would, in effect, prevent the prosecutor from enforcing
the law, which contradicts the important public interest of criminal
68
law enforcement.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....").
158. See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press,80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 435-46 (2002) (discussing the difficulty of defining "the press").
159. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
160. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... ).
161. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d
160 (2d Cir. 2006).
162. Id.
163. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 986 (D.C. Cir.) (Tatel, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Cooper v. United States and Miller v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2977
(2005).
164. Id. at 966 (majority opinion).
165. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000) (making it a felony for individuals with classified
information to knowingly disclose the identity of a covert agent).
166. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 966-67.
167. Id.
168. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (stating that privileges challenge "the
longstanding principle that 'the public ... has a right to every man's evidence,' except for those
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Even though recognition of the reporter's privilege may hamper the
grand jury process, the freedom of the press is equally, if not more,
important. The reporters in both In re Grand Jury Subpoena and
Gonzales relied on the idea that the press should be protected from
government intrusion. 169 This issue was particularly important in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena because it appeared to some that the government had used the press as a means to retaliate against an opponent
who spoke out against it.170 If that were true, the best way to protect
the press may have been to require the reporters to reveal their
sources so that the government would be deterred from using the
press for malicious purposes. 171 Even if that reasoning is valid, the
D.C. Circuit followed the wrong path to reach its intended outcome.
Its decision did compel the reporters to reveal their sources, 172 but did
not make clear that the situation was rare and that, in most other
cases involving reporters and their confidential sources, the court
should not be able to compel disclosure. Had the D.C. Circuit taken
the approach of the Southern District of New York, it could have recognized the privilege and still found that it had been overcome in that
particular situation. That, at least, would have sent the message that it
is generally improper to compel reporters to reveal their sources.
Rather, the D.C. Circuit decision provides no guidance and leaves reporters open to further government intrusion.
B.

The Approach Taken by the D.C. Circuit
Added to the Confusion

The judges deciding In re Grand Jury Subpoena were divided on
whether a common-law privilege between reporters and their confidential sources exists under Rule 501.173 Therefore, the majority
opinion essentially stated that the court did not know whether the
privilege existed. This approach provides no guidance to a lower
persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege") (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
169. See In re GrandJury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 967-68; N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F.
Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating the positions of the reporters), vacated, 459 F.3d 160
(2d Cir. 2006).
170. See, e.g., Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Sources of Confusion, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28,
2005, at 40 (opinions vary on whether "the leak was (1) an insidious smear by the White House
to retaliate against a critic of the Iraq war or (2) mildly interesting gossip").
171. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 1003 (Tatel, J., concurring) ("[Cooper's] story
itself makes the case for punishing the leakers. While requiring Cooper to testify may discourage future leaks, discouraging leaks of this kind is precisely what the public interest requires.").
172. Id. at 976 (majority opinion) (affirming the district court's decision that the reporters
must reveal their sources).
173. Id. at 973.
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court faced with the same issue. Rather than being able to refer to the
circuit court's decision in deciding whether the privilege exists, a lower
court is left to follow whichever of the three concurrences it finds
most compelling. Effectively, the D.C. Circuit left the lower court
with no more guidance than they had prior to its decision.
Judge Henderson's concurrence takes a different view, stating that
1 74
if the court did not have to reach the issue, it should not have.
While this may be true, it is not applicable to the tactic that the D.C.
Circuit used because the court did reach the issue. 175 Judge Henderson's argument could be compelling if the court had held that, because
it had already found that the First Amendment did not provide the
privilege, it did not need to go further and decide the common-law
issue, but that is not what the court did. Rather, the court decided the
issue, and provided a confusing nonstandard for the lower courts to
follow.
Some scholars advocate the cautious approach taken by the D.C.
Circuit. Most commonly, it is referred to as "decisional minimalism."'1 76 Decisional minimalism can be defined as "the phenomenon
of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as
much as possible undecided."'1 77 Professor Cass Sunstein argues that
decisional minimalism is preferred in some situations because it "can
be democracy-forcing,"'1 78 in that it forces debate and decisionmaking
by politically accountable actors. 17 9 Further, in highly controversial or
complex areas, it may be proper to avoid having judges decide the
issue incorrectly or ineffectively. 180 Proponents of the minimalist approach may argue that the reporter's privilege is an area primed for
judicial minimalism because the issue may be better suited for Congress and because, particularly in the context of In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the issue is highly controversial and complex. Although that
reasoning has merit, journalistic privilege is an area of law which
would benefit from bright-line rules. All parties involved should have
clear notice of the potential consequences of using confidential
181
sources or providing confidential information to a reporter.
174. Id. at 981-82 (Henderson, J., concurring).
175. The court reached the issue by finding that, regardless of whether the common-law privilege existed or not, it had been overcome. See id. at 973 (majority opinion).
176. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. Rev. 4, 6 (1996).
177. Id. Sunstein acknowledges that this definition is extremely simplistic, but it will suffice
for the scope of this Comment. See id. at 7 n.2.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See deRoos Rood & Grossman, supra note 6, at 803 (stating that the most important
aspect of a privilege is that it allows people to predict when they will be protected).
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Although he believes in minimalism, Sunstein also recognizes that
"[m]inimalism is appropriate only in certain contexts"' 182 and that "[i]t
is hardly a sensible approach for all officials, or even all judges, all of
the time. ' 183 Even though minimalist decisions may force democracy
and avoid mistakes, there are some situations where there is a larger
danger created "through dissimilar treatment of the similarly situated. ' 184 The reporter's privilege is an example. If courts are applying different standards to questions of the common-law privilege, and
individuals in similar situations are being treated differently depending on where their case is being tried, then no reporter or source is
going to want to engage in a confidential relationship anywhere, because there is no way to tell whether they may be subject to penalties
for their conduct. That situation is far more problematic than a court
making the "wrong" decision and recognizing, or not recognizing, the
privilege.185
Given these considerations, it becomes clear that the question of
the reporter's privilege is ill-suited for the minimalist approach the
D.C. Circuit took. 186 In fact, this area of law may be better suited for
"judicial maximalism." Maximalism is defined "as an effort to decide
cases in a way that establishes broad rules for the future and that also
gives deep theoretical justifications for outcomes. ' 187 If the outcome
sought by a maximalist decision is a clear rule that may be applied
easily in the future, then a maximalist decision is ideal for the area of
the reporter's privilege.

182. Sunstein, supra note 176, at 28.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 29.
185. Sunstein recognizes that "it may be even worse to allow cases to be decided by multiple
district court judges thinking very differently about the problem at hand." Id. Judge Harry
Edwards generally agrees with the minimalist position. He argues that courts should usually
take a limited approach and decide only those issues that are necessary. See Harry T. Edwards,
The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practicein FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 413-20 (1983-1984). In cases involving "specific
types of recurring problems," cases involving "potentially enormous problem[s]," and those
which "allow for thorough clarifications of existing case law or detailed statements in anticipation of future case problems," however, the court should use "wide-angle adjudication." Id. at
413-14 (emphasis omitted). This will provide guidance to lower courts and will force the judges
to "'think out' all the various implications of their actions as fully and as carefully as possible
and to accept responsibility for their judgments and choices." Id. at 419.
186. The D.C. Circuit's approach is minimalist because it answers the question without going
into any detail about the reasoning it used to get to its decision. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cooper v. United States and Miller
v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
187. Sunstein, supra note 176, at 15.
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The Court Should Find a Qualified Reporter's Privilege

The D.C. Circuit could have avoided adding to the confusion surrounding the reporter's privilege if it had followed the approach taken

by the Southern District of New York. Both courts decided cases
dealing with a reporter's privilege, but they came to completely different results. 188 The courts addressed similar fact patterns, but their dif-

ferent analytical strategies lead them to different conclusions. The
D.C. Circuit erred in its approach and ultimate conclusion; it should
have analyzed the common-law privilege pursuant to the framework
laid out in Jaffee, and concluded that there is a qualified privilege

under the common law.
As previously stated, the Supreme Court has not analyzed whether
reporters are protected by a privilege under Rule 501.189 However,

the Jaffee Court established the framework for analyzing whether such
a privilege should be recognized. 190 The D.C. Circuit was presented
with the question of a reporter's privilege under Rule 501, but it made
no attempt to analyze the issue under Jaffee.191 Such an approach was
improper. Clearly, "there is an absolute duty to apply the law as last
pronounced by superior judicial authority. ' 192 Jaffee spoke directly to

the issue facing the D.C. Circuit, yet incredibly, the court failed to
even mention the case in the majority opinion. 193 Certainly, the D.C.
Circuit understood that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent,
because the court, and Judge Sentelle in particular, based its opinion

on Branzburg.194
irresponsible.
1.

The

court's analysis was inconsistent

and

The Private Interests

Had the D.C. Circuit applied the Jaffee test, it may have come to the
same conclusion as the Gonzales court and found that there is a common-law privilege for reporters. The first factor of the Jaffee test ana188. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 965; N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F.
Supp. 2d 457, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
189. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
190. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
191. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 972-73.
192. Maurice Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 4
(1967).
193. Jaffee is not mentioned until the middle of Judge Sentelle's opinion, in a footnote. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 979 n.4 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 968 (majority opinion) ("[Tlhe Highest Court considered and rejected the same
claim of First Amendment privilege on facts materially indistinguishable from those at bar."); id.
at 977 (Sentelle, J., concurring) ("I find Branzburg v. Hayes to be as dispositive of the question
of common law privilege as it is of a First Amendment privilege." (citation omitted)).
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lyzes whether the privilege would serve private interests. 195 In Jaffee,
the Court looked at the relationship between the patient and her psychotherapist and whether the privilege would protect that relationship.1 96 Like a relationship between a psychotherapist and patient,
that between a reporter and her confidential source also relies on
98
trust. 197 If this trust is eroded, the relationship will no longer thrive.'
Confidential sources are of such importance to reporters that if the
relationships disintegrate, reporters will no longer be able to perform
their jobs as they currently do. 199 In re Grand Jury Subpoena completely ignores this possibility, and in doing so, fails to show any concern for the potential degradation of the press, which is a fundamental
institution in a democratic society.
That the reporter's profession would completely change if reporters
could no longer rely on confidential sources is supported by the affidavits filed in Gonzales.20° Two of the affidavits were filed by former
reporters Russell Scott Armstrong and Jack Nelson.2 0 1 They stated
that confidential sources usually require "guarantees of confidentiality
before any extensive exchange of information is permitted. 2 0 2 They
also stated that confidential sources have been behind some of the
biggest news stories in recent history, including Watergate, the pardon
of President Nixon, the improper activities of the Office of Management and Budget Director during the Carter presidency, the IranContra Affair, and the Monica Lewinsky scandal. 20 3 It is mind-boggling to think that, without confidential sources, some of those scandals may have never reached the light of day. What would society be
like today if those scandals had never been revealed? Will society
continue to move forward if future scandals of the same magnitude
are never made public? As Jack Nelson noted, denying the privilege
"would undoubtedly have a ripple effect, silencing whistleblowers and
195. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d
160 (2d Cir. 2006).
196. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
197. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (discussing the relationship between reporters and their
sources).

198. Id.
199. Id. (discussing the effect that losing confidential sources would have on Miller's and She-

non's jobs).
200. Id. at 470-71.

201. Id. at 470.
202. Id.
203. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (discussing the experience of Jack Nelson). Historian
Anna Nelson also filed an affidavit in the case. She stated that "confidential sources are often
the only sources available to the journalist and thus the original source for historians seeking to
unravel public policy or foreign policy," noting that "[a] journalist's exposure of the My-Lai
incident is just such an example." Id. at 471.
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other government employees who might otherwise cooperate with the
'20 4
press in exposing government wrongdoing.
Reporters are not the only professionals to understand the importance of confidential sources, nor are they the only professionals to
benefit from the relationship. Jeffrey H. Smith, a government lawyer,
filed an affidavit in Gonzales discussing the benefit that the govern20 5
ment receives from the reporter-confidential source relationship.
Smith stated that "federal agencies benefit from the ability to have
official [sic] speak confidentially" because it "permits the government
to get information to the public without attribution to a named official
or without publicly declaring the statement as official policy. ' 20 6 This
may not always be the case, particularly when a government employee
is acting as a whistleblower, but one can imagine situations in which
20 7
the administration may want to leak a story to soften the blow.
Upon review of this information, the Gonzales court recognized the
importance of the reporter's privilege:
[It] would serve significant private interests by permitting investigative reporters to continue to secure information from confidential
sources with greater assurance that they would not be compelled to
reveal the information obtained or the source of that information or
run the risk of court-imposed sanctions, either option posing a
threat to the reporters' ability to obtain confidential
information in
20 8
the future or to publish investigative stories at all.
Had the judges taken the time to fully review the claim under the
framework created by the Supreme Court in Jaffee, the D.C. Circuit
may have reached these same conclusions.
2.

The Public Interests

As the Court in Jaffee stated, in order for a court to recognize a
privilege, it must also serve public interests. 20 9 The psychotherapistpatient privilege protects a vital public interest: "The mental health of
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of tran204. Id. at 470.
205. Id. at 471.
206. Id.
207. West Wing fans will remember that prior to the announcement about President Bartlett's
multiple sclerosis, C.J., the White House press secretary, informed the head of the network that
was going to run the statement that she would "start to leak Wednesday morning to soften up
the ground a little bit." West Wing: 18th and Potomac (NBC television broadcast May 9, 2001),
http://www.twiztv.com/cgi-bin/thewestwing.cgi?episode=http://dmca.free.fr/scripts/thewestwing/
season2/thewestwing-221.txt.
208. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
209. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (relying on Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981), for the idea that the privilege must "serv[e] public ends" (alteration in
original)).
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scendent importance. ' 210 The reporter's privilege would protect an
equally important interest-an informed public.
Most legal and political science scholars are familiar with philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn's "enlightened public" argument. 2 11 The
enlightened public argument holds that one of the reasons for protecting speech is that free speech allows all of the ideas to reach the public, which in turn leads to a more enlightened society. 212 Meiklejohn
states that "all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully
and fairly presented to the meeting so that all alternative lines of action can be wisely measured in relation to one another. ' 213 This argument applies with special force to the First Amendment, but its
reasoning is also relevant to the common-law reporter's privilege.
One of the most prevalent sources of the "ideas" that Meiklejohn
speaks about is the press. 214 Taking away one of the primary sources
of a reporter's information would prevent certain ideas from being
disseminated in the public discourse. Discussion would be stifled and,
as a result, a less enlightened public would emerge.2 15 To avoid this
result, the best course of action is to recognize the privilege and protect this important relationship, and in turn protect the press itself.
Recognition of this privilege will further yet another important public interest that stems from the concept of free speech-placing a
check on the government. 216 The American system of democratic
government is a system of checks and balances. 21 7 One of the most
important checks-recognized in the Constitution, though not for this
purpose-is free speech. The press is in the best position to enforce
that check because it has access to the government that normal citi210. Id.
211. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
212. Id.
213. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
25 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948) (quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1019 (2d ed. 1991)).
214. Id.
215. Members of the Supreme Court have recognized this issue. Most notably, Justice Douglas attributed his belief to Meiklejohn in his dissent regarding Caldwell v. United States, one of
the cases addressed by the Court in Branzburg. 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Meiklejohn, supra note 211, at 254).
216. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.

RES. J.521, 527 ("This is the value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in
checking the abuse of power by public officials."). If the speculation that the leak of Valerie
Plame's name was part of a White House-orchestrated smear campaign is correct, then it illustrates the press's ability to check the government by bringing to light its unethical actions.
217. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) (discussing Congress's power to create a provision for the removal of executive officers); see also Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash &
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) ("Even the Government-the organ of the whole people-is
restricted by the system of checks and balances established by our Constitution.").
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zens do not.2 18 The press has the ability to bring unwise or corrupt
government actions to light, but it is able to do so only because it is
protected by the First Amendment.2 19 To truly do its job in maintaining government accountability, the press "requires independence from
government; it requires rights that give [it] a defense against government intrusions. 2' 2 0 This includes protection of the relationship between reporters and their confidential sources within the government,
so that the press's ability to check government abuse will not be di-

minished. A court which is interested in maintaining that ability
should find a reporter's privilege.
In Gonzales, the Southern District of New York recognized that the

press is important in keeping the public informed. 221 Most of the
court's decision was based on an analysis of the monumental news
stories that relied on confidential sources, such as Watergate, the IranContra Affair, and Monica Lewinsky. 222 In contrast, in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, the D.C. Circuit did not discuss any public interests
that may be served by the privilege. 2 23 Like the Southern District, the
D.C. Circuit should have recognized that the privilege would serve the
public interests discussed above.
3.

The Balancing Test

After determining that the privilege will serve private and public
interests, a court applying Jaffee must ask whether those interests outweigh the harm that would occur if the privilege were recognized and
applied. 224 If so, then the privilege should be recognized. 225 If, however, the harm will exceed the benefit served by recognizing the inter218. Cf Christopher Cooper & John D. McKinnon, White House Press Room as Political
Stage, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2005, at BI (stating that one of the requirements for permanent
clearance into the White House is a congressional press pass, but that daily clearance may be
granted after a security check).
219. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,

or of the press ....").
220. C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 819, 840 (1980).

221. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 499-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that
the Supreme Court has recognized this importance in past decisions), vacated, 459 F.3d 160 (2d
Cir. 2006).
222. Id. at 498.
223. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 972-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Cooper v. United States and Miller v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005).
224. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
225. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (John T.

McNaughton ed. 1961) (1904) (noting that for the court to recognize a privilege "[t]he injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation").
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ests, then the court should refrain from recognizing the privilege. 226
This balancing test is important because privileges necessarily hamper
the truth-seeking objective of the judicial system. 227 Privileges are
therefore only justified on the basis of an interest in protecting a relationship or a greater societal goal.
This balancing test is the most difficult part of the court's analysis.
The D.C. Circuit did not attempt to balance the issues at all. 22 8 This is
unfortunate, particularly when the interests involved are so important.
Had the court fully analyzed the issue, it would have balanced the
relationship between a reporter and his source-and the press in general-against obtaining information that might help the prosecutor
discover who leaked the name of a covert CIA agent, an act which
potentially could have placed the lives of many people in danger. 229
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the court refused to recognize the privilege and permanently injured the relationship between reporters and
their sources. In Gonzales, however, the court recognized the privilege even though the government would be placed at a disadvantage. 230 As in Judge Tatel's concurrence in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, the Gonzales court recognized that the effect on the reporter's relationship with the confidential source, and on the reporter's job in general, would be so severe that the privilege must be
recognized despite the evidentiary benefit to the government. 23 1
Without the privilege, "[r]eporters could reprint government statements, but not ferret out underlying disagreements among officials;
they could cover public governmental actions, but would have great
difficulty getting potential whistleblowers to talk about government
misdeeds; they could report arrest statistics, but not garner first-hand
information about the criminal underworld. ' 232
In Jaffee, the Court argued that even if a privilege was not recognized, the future evidentiary benefit would be miniscule-patients
would stop talking to their psychiatrists, and the evidence would never
226. See id.
227. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial Privileges and
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 792 (2002) ("[P]roponents have sought to

justify the rules on the ground that they serve to protect some relationship or other societal
goal.").
228. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 972-73.

229. See Scott Shane, Private Spy and Public Spouse Live at Center of Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2005, at A12 ("Disclosing the [CIA] employment of officers under cover can endanger the
officers, their operations and their agents .... ).
230. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 459 F.3d
160 (2d Cir. 2006).
231. See id. at 501; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 991 (Tatel, J., concurring).
232. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 991 (Tatel, J., concurring).
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exist in the first place.2 33 Therefore, there would be little evidentiary
benefit, but a significant harm would result because people would no

longer turn to psychotherapists for assistance. 234 As a result, the psychotherapists' job would all but disappear. This reasoning applies to
the reporter's privilege as well. 235 As discussed above, without the
privilege, the confidential sources that reporters so heavily rely upon
will begin to disappear. 236 Therefore, the evidence will also disappear,
and the privilege will not provide the party seeking the information

with any evidentiary benefit.2 37 Failing to recognize the privilege,
however, will cause great harm to reporters and the media profession

in general.
Of course, the privilege does not have to be absolute. Both the
D.C. Circuit and the Southern District of New York were hesitant to
recognize an absolute privilege, preferring a qualified privilege or
none at all.2 38 This concern is well founded. Recognizing that the
239
privilege is limited is still acceptable under this Comment's analysis.
As long as the privilege that is recognized would protect reporters and

their sources in most situations, then both the private and public interests would be protected. Both the reporter and the source would be

placed on notice that, if the topic of discussion is extremely important
or dangerous, the reporter may be compelled to give up the source's

name. The most important thing about the privilege is "outcome predictability. ' 240 The privilege is useless "[u]nless sources can predict
that their identities will be protected under the law. '24 1 Even a lim-

ited privilege would provide some guidelines with which a source
could predict whether there would be a possibility that his or her identity could be revealed. 2 42 A limited privilege is also consistent with
233. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996).
234. See id.
235. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
236. See supra notes 199-206.
237. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
238. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir.) ("[A]ll believe
that if there is any such privilege, it is not absolute and may be overcome by an appropriate
showing."), cert. denied sub nom. Cooper v. United States and Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
2977 (2005); Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 501 ("[N]o basis is found here to recognize anything
more than a qualified privilege.").
239. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 (recognizing a limited privilege between psychotherapists and their
patients); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (recognizing a limited privilege
between spouses).
240. deRoos Rood & Grossman, supra note 6, at 803.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 996-97 (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge
Tatel proposes balancing the harm caused by the leak against the importance of the news story.
If the story had only marginal news value, but the leak could create a great deal of harm, then
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Rule 501,243 Supreme Court precedent, 244 and other evidentiary
245
privileges.
4. State Consensus
The final factor that the D.C. Circuit should have considered in its
analysis is the existence of state laws recognizing the privilege. State
laws matter because they are indicators that the proposed privilege is
supported by "reason and experience," as Rule 501 requires. 246 Moreover, there are federalism concerns. If a federal court were to refuse
to recognize the privilege, state laws would be frustrated. 247 Both the
Gonzales court and Judge Tatel's concurrence in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena recognized that the majority of states provide a qualified
privilege for reporters. 248 Not all fifty states have recognized the priv249
ilege, but there is a consensus in its favor.
State shield laws provide various levels of protection for reporters.
The level of privilege varies in each state, from near-complete protection 2 50 to protection only in very specific situations. 251 California has
enacted a shield law as part of its constitution. 252 Many states have
also enacted statutory balancing tests to determine whether the privithe privilege should give way. Id. Although this is by no means a bright-line rule, it at least
provides the reporter and the source with some guidelines.
243. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 (leaving it to the court to recognize "a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges ...

on a case-by-case basis").

244. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that "only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order").
245. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (discussing the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege).
246. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996).
247. See id.
248. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have recognized the privilege), vacated, 459 F.3d
160 (2d Cir. 2006); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 993 (D.C.
Cir.) (Tatel, J., concurring) (stating that forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have recognized the privilege), cert. denied sub nor. Cooper v. United States and Miller v. United States,
125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005).
249. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d. at 504 ("[T]he near unanimous consensus of the states as to
the importance of offering qualified, and in some cases absolute, protection to reporters with
respect to confidential sources leads to the same conclusion [as Jaffee] here.").
250. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520 (2005) (providing protection from being compelled to
testify, as well as protection against having papers and office searched unless there is reason to
suspect that the reporter has committed a crime).
251. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999) (extending a privilege "only to information or eyewitness observations obtained within the normal scope of employment").
252. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 2(b).
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lege has been overcome. 2 53 In states whose legislatures have not en-

acted shield laws, courts have taken the initiative to recognize the
254
privilege.
Deference to states' policies was also recognized in Rule 501. The

rule provides that "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law. '2 55 The rationale for this was that "[flederal law should not
supersede that of States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a
compelling reason. ' 256 The fact that Rule 501 affords deference to
state law provides further reason for courts to look to state law to
support their decisions.
When states recognize a privilege that is not recognized in many
federal courts, or by federal law as a whole, the potential for confusion is quite high. 257 A reporter who is using a confidential source
may not know whether the relationship will be protected under state
law, or unprotected under federal law. This kind of inconsistency,
particularly when it is present across the country, indicates that the
issue needs to be addressed 2 58-especially when the consequences in259
clude jail time.
IV. IMPACT
In re Grand Jury Subpoena and Gonzales only exacerbated the confusion about the reporter's privilege caused by the combination of the
open-ended nature of Rule 501, the variety of state shield laws, and
253. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1999) (stating that the privilege can be overcome
when the information "(1) [ius material and relevant; (2) [clannot be reasonably obtained by
alternative means; and (3) [i]s necessary to the proper preparation or presentation of the case of
a party seeking the information, document, or item").
254. See Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 502 n.36 (collecting cases).
255. FED. R. EVID. 501.
256. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7053.
257. See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Oklahoma et al. in Support of Petitioners at *3,
Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 04-1508), 2005 WL 1317523 ("Uncertainty and confusion . . . have marked this area of the law in the three decades that have
passed since this Court decided Branzhurg [sic] and the Congress enacted Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
258. Id. at *2-3 ("A federal policy that allows journalists to be imprisoned for engaging in the
same conduct that these State privileges encourage and protect 'buck[s] file clear policy of virtually all states' and undermines both the purpose of the shield laws, and the policy determinations
of the State courts and legislatures that adopted them." (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
259. Don Van Natta Jr., et al., The Miller Case: A Notebook, a Cause, a Jail Cell and a Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at Al (stating that Miller "spent 85 days in jail").
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the disparate interpretations of Branzburg. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, in particular, provided no standard for lower courts to apply,
and set forth at least three different perspectives on the issue. 260 Gonzales created a clear rule that was consistent with Rule 501 and Jaffee,
but lacks power to change the law in this area because it is only a
district court decision. The polarity of the decisions will further confuse those who may be affected by the existence, or lack thereof, of a
reporter's privilege. This confusion will lead to the erosion of the
press by taking away one of the reporter's most important sources of
information-the confidential source. 26 1 The reporter's profession
will change, and the press will no longer be able to fulfill its fundamental purpose of providing information to the public. 262 The most
appropriate solution to these problems is for the Supreme Court to
address the issue and recognize a federal reporter's privilege. 2 63 This
action would erase the inconsistency and clarify the state of affairs for
reporters and confidential sources alike.
A.

Confidential Sources Will Vanish

One result of the unclear decision handed down by the D.C. Circuit
is also a theme of this Comment: without the reporter's privilege, the
sources that reporters rely on so heavily will begin to vanish. 264 The
high publicity surrounding In re Grand Jury Subpoena, in particular,
will begin to have that effect, because reporters and sources are now
clearly aware that their relationship could result in jail time if the material shared is sufficiently sensitive. 26 5 At this point, at least one
266
Bush Administration official has lost his job and is facing jail time,
and Fitzgerald has yet to rule out the possibility that more indictments
may be handed down. 26 7 To all potential confidential sources, this
260. See supra notes 86-120.
261. See infra notes 264-267.
262. See infra notes 268-272.
263. See infra notes 273-282.
264. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for
Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist'sPrivilege, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 201, 250 (2005) (discussing studies which "have shown that news informants are dissuaded from divulging information to reporters, and that reporters are less likely to pursue such stories, if there is not a high
degree of certainty that the confidentiality cannot be pierced").
265. The news of Miller being jailed for refusing to name her source, and the indictment of
Libby after she finally did, was all over the media. As of September 6, 2006, a search of the
Westlaw news database for "Judith Miller" and "Libby" turned up 3677 documents while a
search for "Judith Miller" and "C.I.A." turned up 7587 documents.
266. David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Aide Charged with Lying in Leak Case:
Libby Quits Post, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at Al (reporting Libby's indictment).
267. After indicting Libby, special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald continued his investigation,
which seemed centered on political strategist Karl Rove. See Jim VandeHei & Carol D. Leon-
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sends a clear message-speak to reporters at your own risk. No
amount of talking or speculating could send a more clearly stated message. Even though the Southern District of New York protected the
relationship between reporters and their sources, it is not sufficient to
quell the concerns that In re Grand Jury Subpoena created.
B.

The Reporters' Profession Will Change

The obvious impact on the reporters' profession is that reporters
may have to devise new methods for getting their story. If, as this
Comment suggests, the number of individuals willing to serve as confidential sources diminishes due to a fear that their identity will not be
protected, then reporters will have to alter their research methods.
Given the perception that confidential sources are in some instances
unreliable, this may not seem like a bad thing. 268 In many situations,
however, the confidential source provides information which enriches
and develops a story beyond what the reporter would have been able
to do on his own.
Watergate provides a good example. It was clear that something
was amiss in the Nixon White House after the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters on June 17, 1972, but without
the help of Mark Felt-also known as Deep Throat-Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein never would have discovered everything they
did.26 9 Felt's involvement started with simply "confirming or denying
confidential information for the reporter[s]," 270 but soon he "began
providing leads and outlining an administration-sanctioned conspiracy."' 2 71 Felt "lived in solitary dread, under the constant threat of being summarily fired or even indicted. '272 Therefore, the most
important part of the relationship between Woodward, Bernstein, and
Felt was the agreement of confidentiality. Without the help of Felt, or
another feasible way to obtain the information, Woodward and Bernnig, Cheney Aide Libby Is Indicted: Rove Spared but Remains Under Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Oct.
29, 2005, at Al. Recently, however, Rove was told that he would not be charged in the investigation. See Jim VandeHei, Rove Will Not Be Charged in CIA Leak Case, Lawyer Says, WASH.
POST, June 14, 2006, at Al. Given that revelation, it appears that the investigation has all but
concluded, although Fitzgerald has not officially closed the investigation. Id.
268. Cf.New York Times Co., Guidelines for Confidential News Sources (Feb. 25, 2004),
http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-sources.html (recognizing that when the newspaper uses anonymous sources, "at least some readers may suspect that the newspaper is being
used to convey tainted information or special pleading").
269. John D. O'Connor, "I'm the Guy They Called Deep Throat," VANITY FAIR, July 2005, at
86.
270. Id. at 129.
271. Id.
272. Id.

2007]

THE COMMON-LAW REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

755

stein would have been left at a standstill. That paralysis is precisely
what reporters face today. Without the protection of a privilege, reporters will be unable to promise anonymity to their sources. If the
sources will no longer talk, then the reporters will have to change their
approach and face the fact that they will no longer be able to get the
information they need to write complete stories.
C.

The Supreme Court Should Recognize a Federal Privilege

The solution this Comment proposes is federal recognition of the
privileged relationship between reporters and their confidential
sources in most situations. This proposal recognizes that privileges,
especially absolute privileges, "interfere[ ] with the fair administration
of justice. ' ' 273 The most important function of the recognized privilege
is that it would provide predictability to both the reporter and to the
source about when their communication would or would not be protected. 274 By providing some kind of parameters for the relationship,
sources will still feel free to share information with reporters without
fearing disclosure, and the reporters will feel free to discuss the information with the sources without fear of being placed in jail.
The question then becomes whether the privilege should be created
by a federal statute or whether the Supreme Court should simply
grant certiorari in one of the cases and recognize the privilege. There
are arguments in favor of both approaches. Some have argued
that a federal statute is more appropriate for this task. 27 5 The argument is that the privilege is substantive law, which "entails the
weighing of competing policy interests, ' 2 76 and that this is a legislative function, not a judicial one. 277 Congress has tried in the past
273. deRoos Rood & Grossman, supra note 6, at 805.
274. Id. at 803.
275. Id. at 782 ("It is important that the legislature and not the judiciary establish this
privilege.").
276. Id.
277. Id. There is also a question of whether the court has the power to create federal common
law. Federal common law may be defined as "any federal rule of decision that is not mandated
on the face of some authoritative federal text." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers
of FederalCourts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (emphasis omitted). Rule 501 does not declare
that a privilege exists, but it does direct that courts should decide whether a privilege exists.
Court-created common law raises concerns of federalism, separation of powers, and electoral
accountability. Id. at 13-17. However, when Congress has expressly delegated lawmaking authority to the courts, and the "delegation has taken place with enough specificity to notify the
states and electorally accountable bodies about the sorts of issues as to which lawmaking authority has been transferred to federal courts," then the court may permissibly create the law without
crossing any barriers. Id. at 42. Rule 501 is an example of a permissible delegation of lawmaking
authority because "[t]he intent to delegate is unmistakable, and the area of testimonial privilege
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to enact a federal reporter's privilege statute but failed for various
8
27

reasons.
This Comment, however, takes the position that Supreme Court
recognition of the privilege would be more appropriate than a congressionally created federal statute. In creating Rule 501, Congress
delegated the power to create new privileges to the courts rather than
keeping that power for itself.2 79 That decision was based in part on
the fact that Congress believed that the law of privilege should be
given space to develop and therefore should be created on a case-by-

case basis, which is more the province of courts.2 80 Rule 501 instructed that the rules of privilege should "be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. '28' Given that
delegation of power to the courts, it would seem contradictory for
Congress to now take on a question of privilege and create a new rule.
Further, the Supreme Court has in the past used Rule 501 to recognize
new privileges. 28 2 Clearly, the procedure created in Rule 501 works;
there is no reason for Congress to take the issue away from the Court.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in In re Grand Jury Subpoena.28 3 Considering the ramifications of the D.C. Circuit's decision,
and the highly controversial nature of the matter, this was a mistake.
is well enough defined that the states and Congress should have been aware of the sorts of issues
that would henceforth be governed by federal common law." Id.
278. See deRoos Rood & Grossman, supra note 6, at 794-95 (discussing a bill which was
proposed the day after Branzburg was decided). Twenty-eight privilege bills were introduced
that year, with twenty-four following the next year. Id. Some of the reasons that those bills were
not passed include dwindling press support after it became clear the privilege would not be
absolute, the appearance that the courts would read Branzburg liberally to find a qualified privilege, new restraint seen coming from the prosecutor's office, and the fact that the Watergate
scandal took Congress's attention away from enacting a privilege. Id.
279. See Nestler, supra note 264, at 253; see also Miller, supra note 20, at 774-75 ("Congress
declared that the development of privilege law should not be codified by the legislature, but
instead should be continually developed and modified by the courts.").
280. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059
("[Olur action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege
based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case
basis.").
281. FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).

282. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing a privilege between psychotherapists and their patients); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (recognizing a privilege between spouses).
283. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
United States v. Miller, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
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One must assume that the Court had reasons for deciding not to grant
certiorari, though we may never know what they were.
The Second Circuit decided the Gonzales appeal on August 1,
2006.284 Unfortunately, the Second Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit in In
re GrandJury Subpoena, decided that any privilege that would be recognized would be overcome on the facts presented, and therefore "[i]t
[was] unnecessary . . . to rule on whether such a privilege exist[ed]
under Rule 501."285 Hopefully, the New York Times will petition for a
writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court will not make the same mistake twice.
This Comment has highlighted the policy concerns which must be
taken into account when considering the common-law reporter's privilege. Most important among these concerns is the need for clarity, so
reporters and their sources will be aware of the consequences of their
actions. There is clearly disagreement among the courts about the
proper approach to analyzing the issue; the best way to address that is
for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and recognize a commonlaw reporter's privilege.
Elizabeth A. Graham*

284. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2006).
285. Like Judge Tatel, Judge Robert Sack filed a dissent explaining why the privilege should
be recognized. See id. at 174-89 (Sack, J., dissenting).
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